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LEGISLATIVE DELEGATIONS OF POWER AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW-PREVENTING JUDICIAL IMPOTENCE
ROBERT W. MARTIN, JR.*
Courts, commentators, political theorists, and historians all agree
that legislatures may delegate power to administrative agencies.'
All have long abandoned the notion that separation of powers prin-
ciples demand segregation of powers. Even so, the volume and pers-
istence of scholarship discussing legislative delegations attest to the
continuing vigor of the classic separation of powers ideology asso-
ciated with Montesquieu, Madison, and the other framers of our
basic scheme of government. Although there seems to be universal
agreement that administrative agencies should be restrained in the
use of delegated power in order to ensure that private parties will
be protected against abuses of discretion, there is disagreement as
to how that restraint should be accomplished. 2
The delegation cases from various state jurisdictions are confus-
ing, but in the last thirty years two basic approaches have evolved
for determining whether delegated power is sufficiently restrained.
The two approaches will be referred to as "traditional" and
"modern." The traditional approach holds that constitutional prin-
ciples of separation of powers and due process require meaningful
legislative standards and, to a lesser extent, procedural safeguards.3
This approach is premised on the traditional mechanisms of posi-
tive law, which include the practice of judicial review according to
determinate standards. Although procedural processes are deemed
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. B.A. 1973, Hamilton
College; J.D. 1976, Rutgers-Camden Law School. Former Assistant Regional Counsel, United
States Environmental Protection Agency. The time devoted to this article was made possible
by a Faculty Research Award from Florida State University.
1. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1825), in which Chief Justice Marshall
stated:
It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the Courts, or to any other
tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may
certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise
itself . ..
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects,
which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest,
in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to
act under such general provisions to fill up the details.
See also L. TmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-17, at 284-85 (1978). Professor Tribe
notes that the only exception to the rule of delegable power is when the Constitution specifi-
cally states that a cerain power is nondelegable. He points to U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, as one
such exception. That constitutional provision prohibits Congress from delegating the power
to approve treaties.
2. See 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:15, at 208 (2d ed. 1978).
3. See, e.g., Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
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to be important, the traditional approach demands that the legisla-
ture "legislate as far as reasonably practicable"4 and is the approach
adopted by Florida, 5 Arizona,6 and Illinois. 7 It is important to note
that this approach does recognize that some discretion must be
delegated to administrative agencies-hence the qualifier "as far as
practicable." The traditional approach does not necessarily prohibit
a period of experimentation. For example, if the legislature is legis-
lating in a new area, more discretion may be granted to the agency
than would otherwise be allowed. Despite this flexibility, however,
the traditional approach prohibits the legislature from merely iden-
tifying problem areas and passing responsibility for their complete
remediation to an administrative agency.
One of the more prominent advocates of the modern approach,
Professor Kenneth Davis, argues to the contrary that "[tihe crite-
rion for determining the validity of a [legislative] delegation should
be the totality of the protection against arbitrariness, not just the
one strand having to do with statutory standards."'8 As we shall see,
the statutory standards emphasis in fact disappears under this ap-
proach and is replaced by an emphasis on procedural safeguards,
administrative standards, or a combination of the two.' Because the
modern approach is still evolving, jurisdictions that have adopted
it have been reluctant to withdraw completely from the more tradi-
tional approach. As a result, some legislatures have used very broad
legislative standards in an effort to avoid abandoning the traditional
approach. Despite the fact that such standards are actually no more
than statements of legislative intent, some courts have considered
them to be sufficient to meet the requirements of the traditional
approach. 0 For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court ostensibly
insists upon the need for legislative standards, yet the decisions of
4. See Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
5. See, e.g., Department of Business Regulation v. National Manufactured Hous. Fed'n,
Inc., 370 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1979).
6. See, e.g., State Compensation Fund v. De La Fuente, 501 P.2d 422 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1972).
7. See, e.g., Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Cas. Co., 369 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. 1977).
8. K. DAvIs, supra note 2, § 3:15 at 209. Professor Davis refers to his proposal as being a
small alteration in the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 211. This adds some confusion because
courts and commentators now are all in agreement that the nondelegation doctrine is dead.
It seems that it would have been more appropriate and helpful if Davis had referred to his
proposal as being a small alteration to the doctrine of delegation with meaningful legislative
standards.
9. Professor Davis himself has continued to suggest modification to the modern approach.
Although procedural safeguards still are the key to the Davis approach, he has recently
suggested that meaningful administrative standards may also be appropriate. K. DAVIS, supra
note 2, § 3:15 at 211.




that court indicate that such standards are only required in theory."
One aspect of the relationship between separation of powers prin-
ciples and legislative delegations of power that is not fully developed
in the literature is the effect a legislative delegation can have on the
judicial branch of government. The scholarship in the delegation
area has centered on the constitutional legitimacy of one branch of
government, the legislative, relinquishing a portion of its powers to
another branch, the executive. The thesis of this article is that
meaningful legislative standards are necessary to prevent the legis-
lative branch from nullifying the power of the judicial branch to
review agency action." To undermine such review is to compromise
the check and balance system of our three-branch government.
This article argues that the modern approach to questions con-
cerning the validity of legislative delegation to administrative agen-
cies is improper on both separation of powers and due process
grounds. 3 As to separation of powers, the modern approach repre-
sents a commitment to administrative and legislative efficiency at
the cost of judicial effectiveness. The administrative agency under
this approach is something more than a "fourth" branch of govern-
ment; it is a microcosm of the other three branches. Procedural
safeguards are seen as sufficient to protect the structural separation
of powers within the agency. The legislative and judicial roles in this
scheme are very modest; the legislature identifies a goal and tells
the agency to achieve it, and the judiciary reviews the agency action
for compliance with nonexistent statutory standards. The rationale
behind this charade is that the legislature and judiciary must recog-
nize the inevitable complications of a highly complex society. But
11. See, e.g., Avant v. Clifford, 341 A.2d 629 (N.J. 1975). The modern approach, or
variations thereof, has also been endorsed by the New York Court of Appeals, see, e.g., Levine
v. Whalen, 349 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1976); the Washington Supreme Court, see, e.g., Barry &
Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 500 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1972); and the federal
courts, see, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
The United States Supreme Court has only twice held delegations of power to administrative
agencies to be unconstitutional. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). This article, however, will
limit its discussion to state court decisions.
12. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Arizona v. California, noted that legislatively delegated
authority must be adequately limited to insure "that the fundamental policy decisions in our
society will be made . . . Vy the body immediately responsible to the people [and to prevent]
judicial review from being merely an exercise at large by providing the courts with some
measure against which to judge the official action that has been challenged." 373 U.S. 546,
626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
13. This article will limit its discussion to the legislative delegation of power to adminis-
trative agencies. The constitutionality of legislative delegation has arisen in other contexts.
See, e.g., Westervelt v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 263 N.W.2d 564, 578 n.21 (Mich. 1978)
(court noted other areas of legislative delegations besides the legislative delegation of law-
making power to administrative agencies).
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the doctrine of separation of powers teaches that it is impossible for
the courts to exercise their power of judicial review in the absence
of substantive legislative standards. Courts, under the modern ap-
proach, are left with nothing to review except the procedure of the
agency and the agency's conformity with its self-imposed standards;
there is no other criterion by which to judge the substantive action
taken by the agency. The principle of judicial review, which has
become the central identifying feature of the judicial branch in
separation of power theory, simply disappears. Therefore, the mod-
ern approach violates the separation of powers principle by elimi-
nating the practical possibility of judicial checks.
At the same time, the modern approach violates due process be-
cause procedural protections, even coupled with broad legislative
standards, will not prevent improper exercises of power. 4 The dan-
ger to due process is even greater when administrative standards are
substituted for broad legislative standards as the modern approach
advocates. On the other hand, the presence of meaningful legislative
standards, which permit effective judicial review, ensures impartial
exercises of power and therefore due process. Since Florida and New
Jersey typify contrasting approaches, this article will examine cases
from those two jurisdictions.
In the period from 1949 to 1954, there were only five cases in which
the New Jersey Supreme Court held legislative delegations of power
to an administrative agency to be unconstitutional.' 5 Since 1954,
however, the court has consistently found very broad legislative
delegations to be constitutional despite the fact that legislative
standards have been all but nonexistent.'" In Motyka v. McCorkle"
the New Jersey Supreme Court discussed the need for legislative
14. See Drexel v. City of Miami Beach, 64 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 66 So. 2d
510 (Fla. 1953).
15. Weiner v. Borough of Stratford, 104 A.2d 659 (N.J. 1954) (no standards present to
guide determination of borough council as to when license for new business was to be
granted); Jamouneau v. Local Gov't Bd., 78 A.2d 553 (N.J. 1951) (statute failed to specify
conditions upon which approval for sale of government property would be granted); Abelson's
Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists, 75 A.2d 867 (N.J. 1950) (vague standards used
by the Board which made decisions concerning license to practice optometry); New Jersey
Turnpike Auth. v. Parsons, 69 A.2d 875 (N.J. 1949) (State Highway Commissioner given
discretion as to amount of funds to be suballocated to the Turnpike Authority); State v.
Traffic Tel. Workers' Fed'n, 66 A.2d 616 (N.J. 1949) (statute failed to provide guidelines to
the board of arbitration).
16. See, e.g., Motyka v. McCorkel, 276 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1971); Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d
521 (N.J. 1968). It should be noted that at least one critic argues that a court's willingness or
unwillingness to accept broad delegations depends on the subject matter of the statute. "It
is when delegated power affects the use of real property or the practice of a profession that
the judicial nerve tingles." Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: I, 47 CoLus.
L. REV. 561, 586 (1947).
17. 276 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1971).
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standards in connection with the statute authorizing that state's
participation in the Aid for Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program." Although the court expounded on the need for
legislative standards to guide the exercise of delegated power, the
standards that the court found sufficient were general standards
indeed. 9 In actuality it appears that no meaningful legislative stan-
dards existed in the delegation at all. What did exist, was a state-
ment of a legislative goal along with a judicial finding that proce-
dural safeguards had been established within the agency.20
Similarly, in Burton v. Sills the New Jersey Supreme Court nar-
rowed its focus to concentrate almost exclusively on administrative
procedural standards.2' In doing so, it unfortunately again held
broad legislative standards to be sufficient. The court stated that
"the statute explicitly directs the Superintendent to prescribe stan-
dards and qualifications necessary for 'the public safety, health and
welfare'; this guideline, though general, is comparable to that set
forth in many other State enactments and is, in its context, clearly
sufficient."' The court also noted that safeguards against arbitrary
official action were probably more significant than a highly detailed
statutory standard.'
It is important to note that this emphasis on procedural protec-
tion in lieu of specific legislative standards does not mean that
adminstrative agencies in New Jersey are totally unrestricted. In
Pascucci v. Vagott, for example, regulations promulgated by the
New Jersey Division of Public Welfare providing that a lesser
amount of financial assistance be awarded to persons classified as
employable than to those classified as unemployable were held to
be invalid.24 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
18. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10-1 to 10-8. (West Supp. 1979). The court stated that the
challenged statute:
did not endeavor to fix the standards of need or the level of benefits but left these
matters, along with most other matters, to administrative regulation. Thus the
Commissioner of Institutions and Agencies was authorized and directed, under
general policies established by the State Board of Control, to issue "all necessary
rules and regulations and administrative orders," and, stressing the legislative goal
to obtain maximum federal funding, the Commissioner was authorized and di-
rected to do all things "necessary to secure for the State of New Jersey the maxi-
mum Federal financial participation that is available with respect to a program of
assistance for dependent children ... "
276 A.2d at 130-31 (citations omitted).
19. See id.
20. Id. at 131. The goal was "to secure for the State of New Jersey the maximum Federal
financial participation that is available. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-3 (West Supp. 1979).
21. 248 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1968).
22. Id. at 523 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:151-19 (West 1969)).
23. Id. See also Avant v. Clifford, 341 A.2d 629, 659-60 (N.J. 1975).
24. 362 A.2d 566 (N.J. 1976).
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"necessary and proper" language of the enabling statute provided
the essential legislative standards.25 But this did not hinder the
court in reaching its conclusion that the regulations were invalid.
Rather, the court focused on legislative intent and held that the
problem was not the broad delegation allowed by the enabling stat-
ute but the fact that the subsequent regulations did not comply with
a proper understanding of the objectives of the legislative policy.26
In other words, the condemning factor as to validity was the actual
implementation of the power by the administrative agency rather
than the initial delegation of power by the legislature. Thus, even
though the court ignored the importance of specific legislative stan-
dards, it still restricted the power of the agency.
It would appear that the New Jersey Supreme Court is unwilling
to state specifically that by allowing the use of general rather than
detailed legislative standards it has created a framework where vir-
tually no legislative standards are required. This reluctance is evi-
denced by the judicial conclusion that such language as "public
convenience and necessity" and "just and reasonable" is suffi-
ciently restrictive to meet the legislative standards requirement.2
The court appears to have abandoned all interest in putting opera-
tive meaning into any nominal constitutional requirement of legisla-
tive standards. Indeed the court has specifically stated that it will
not require that "standards be set forth in express terms, if they
may reasonably be inferred from the statutory scheme as a whole." '
New Jersey is not the only state which has adopted the modern
approach to determining the constitutionality of legislative delega-
tions.29 Although this article disagrees with the conclusion that such
25. Id. at 571.
26. Id.
27. See Avant v. Clifford, 341 A.2d 629, 658-59 (N.J. 1975).
28. Id. at 659 (quoting from Schierstead v. City of Brigantine, 119 A.2d 5, 8 (N.J. 1955)).
See also In re Berardi, 129 A.2d 705, 708 (N.J. 1957).
29. See Levine v. Whalen, 349 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1976). The New York Court spoke of a
standards requirement even though the legislative standards it found to be sufficient'were
very broad. The legislative standard challenged in Levine stated: "In order to provide for the
protection and promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the state, . . . the department
of health shall have the central, comprehensive responsibility for the development and ad-
ministration of the state's policy with respect to hospital and related services." Id. at 823.
The court held that this standard was "not so vague and indefinite as to set no standard or
to outline no policy. . . .The policy of the State, the requirements it imposes and the context
of the questioned provision demonstrate the contrary." Id. Unlike the New Jersey court in
Motyka, 276 A.2d at 135, however, the New York Court did not mention the usefulness or
the necessity of procedural safeguards. This omission is troublesome because procedural
safeguards are essential under the modem approach. See also Board of Supervisors v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 263 N.W.2d 227 (Iowa 1978); Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of N. Ky.,
Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1961); Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 500
P.2d 540 (Wash. 1972).
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approaches are best, it will be interesting to note whether courts will
3.ventually forego the "legislative standards" requirement in theory
as well as in fact. The all-out effort of the judiciary to discover
implied standards serves only to fictionalize the very concept of
legislative standards.30
Under the traditional approach, the process of judicial review is
thought to require the existence of legislative standards to be effec-
tive. States such as New Jersey, although appearing to reject this
approach, continue to search for standards when reviewing agency
action. If the traditional approach is to be abandoned in theory, as
well as in fact, those states which have adopted the modern view
must first face the seemingly impossible task of developing a means
to enable their courts to perform judicial review on the basis of
procedural or administrative protections. Otherwise, the judiciary
will cease to perform its appropriate role.
In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court has clearly held that ei-
ther procedural protections or administrative standards alone will
not be deemed an adequate substitute for legislative standards. The
court has specifically rejected the modern approach and demands
that a legislative delegation of power be accompanied by clear and
narrow legislative standards.3 In Askew v. Cross Key Waterways,
the enabling statute provided relatively precise criteria for the Divi-
sion of State Planning to use in identifying geographic areas of
critical state concern. 2 Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court
30. The Washington Supreme Court has stated:
[A] strictly construed standards doctrine is logically unsound and legally mean-
ingless. The needs and demands of modern government require the delegation of
legislative power without specific guiding standards. . . . We think that it is time
to abandon the notion that the presence or absence of vague verbalisms like "public
interest" or "just and reasonable" make all the difference between valid legislation
and unlawful delegation.
Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 500 P.2d 540, 543 (Wash. 1972) (empha-
sis in original).
Other courts have also been willing to admit that statutory standards are just window-
dressing. For example, in Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of N. Ky., Inc., the court stated:
"Our decisions and those of the other courts of last resort in this country are replete with
mention of 'standards,' much of which has been characterized by a leading authority as
mumbo-jumbo." 352 S.W.2d 203, 207 (Ky. 1961). Although less candid than the Kentucky
court, the Iowa Supreme Court has stated: "[W]e no longer examine legislation for precise
substantive guidelines or standards; emphasis is now on existence of adequate procedural
safeguards. More specifically, where sufficient procedural safeguards are provided by legisla-
tion which also defines general policy, absence of precise substantive guidelines or standards
will not alone be invalidating." Board of Supervisors v. Department of Revenue, 263 N.W.2d
227, 238 (Iowa 1978) (emphasis in original).
31. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
32. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978). The statute under consideration provided:
An area of critical state concern may be designated only for:
(a) An area containing, or having a significant impact upon, environmen-
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found those standards to be insufficient because a fundamentally
legislative task had been delegated to an administrative agency.
The court stated that the modern view "maintains that there should
be a shift in emphasis from legislatively imposed standards for ad-
ministrative action to procedural safeguards in the administrative
process. . . . [I]t clearly has not been the view in Florida. ' 33
This decision was followed by Department of Business Regulation
v. National Manufactured Housing Federation, Inc., where a mobile
home tenant-landlord commission was established to regulate
rental increases in mobile home parks. 3 Elaborate procedural safe-
guards were included within the statutory scheme. These safeguards
specifically provided for notice, hearing, and subsequent appeal
procedures in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.3
Despite these safeguards, the court held that "[tihe criteria for
determining the validity of rental or service charge increases in
subsections (1)(a) and (2)(a) . . . are constitutionally defective be-
cause they charge the commission with the fundamental task of
striking [the] balance between mobile home park owner and mo-
bile home park tenant, without any meaningful guidance. 3'
tal, historical, natural, or archaelogical resources of regional or statewide
importance.
(b) An area significantly affected by, or having a significant effect upon,
an existing or proposed fnajor public facility or other area of major public
investment.
(c) A proposed area of major development potential, which may include a
proposed site of a new community, designated in a state land development
plan.
FLA. STAT. § 380.05(2) (1979).
33. 372 So. 2d at 922-24. The court in Cross Key made much of the fact that the
"geographic area to be regulated by the administrative agency" was not defined in the Florida
statute there under consideration. Id. at 920. The court went on to cite cases from other
jurisdictions, including New Jersey, to support its position that broader statutory standards
were upheld in those jurisdictions because there was a geographical limitation. Id. at 920-22.
The New Jersey case cited by the Cross Key court, Toms River Affiliates v. Department of
Envt'l Protection, however, stated:
It should also be noted that the act affords adequate procedural safeguards to insure
against unreasonable and unwarranted administrative action. . . . These include
provisions for a hearing before the Commissioner and review by the Board. Dissatis-
faction with the result of these proceedings permits judicial review by appeal to the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court.
355 A.2d 679, 684-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
In short, the Toms River case does not conflict with the other New Jersey cases discussed
supra, even though it contains more legislative guidance because the court stressed proce-
dural safeguards.
34. 370 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1979).
35. Id. at 1134; FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1979).
36. 370 So. 2d at 1135 (emphasis added). The statutory provisions under review provided:
(1)(a) Upon petition of 51 percent of the tenants of any dwelling units in a mobile
home park . . . the commission shall hold a hearing . . . to determine whether or
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Florida's approach to the question of the constitutional validity
of legislative delegations of power centers upon the separation of
powers principle. The Florida Constitution states specifically that:
"No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers ap-
pertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided
herein."37 The court in Cross Key thought that this section of the
Florida Constitution was dispositive since it represented an express
limitation on the ability of the legislature to delegate power to an
administrative body.38
The court itself recognized, however, that "other jurisdictions
which subscribe to the [modem approach] have constitutional pro-
visions similar to Article II, Section 3, Florida Constitution .... ,,31
In fact, the language of the New Jersey Constitution is nearly identi-
cal to that contained in the Florida Constitution." It is interesting
to note that the New Jersey Supreme Court evidently found this
language relatively unimportant and certainly not dispositive.4'
not the rental or service charge increase or a decrease in services is so great as to
be unconscionable or not justified under the facts and circumstances of the particu-
lar situation.
(2)(a) The increased costs to the owner of a mobile home park attributable to:
1. Increases in utility rates;
2. Property taxes;
3. Fluctation [sic] in property value;
4. Governmental assessments;
5. Cost of living increases attributable to and relevant to incidental serv-
ices, normal repair, and maintenance; and
6. Capital improvements not otherwise promised or contracted for
may be passed on to the tenants . . . if such increases are reasonable and justified
under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
FLA. STAT. §§ 83.784(1)(a), (2)(a) (1979).
The court in National Manufactured Housing went on to say:
The terms "unconscionable or not justified under the facts and circumstances" .
and the terms "reasonable and justified under the facts and circumstances of the
particular case" . . . are not accompanied by any standards or guidelines to aid a
court or administrative agency in ascertaining the true legislative intent underlying
the act.
370 So. 2d at 1136.
37. FLA. CONST. art. IH, § 3.
38. 372 So. 2d at 924.
39. Id. (footnote omitted).
40. N.J. CONST. art. mI, § 1 states:
The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the
legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constitut-
ing one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the
others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution.
41. Concerning the separation of powers provision in the New Jersey Constitution, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he Federal Constitution does not expressly call for a division of the total power
"among three distinct branches" as does Art. II, § 1, of the State Constitution
quoted above, or explicitly bar, as does that provision of the State Constitution, a
1980]
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It would seem that an underlying ideology is influencing the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's position. The key factor in the court's determi-
nation of the constitutionality of an attempted legislative delegation
is whether or not the legislature has "legislated as far as practica-
ble. "42 This approach is more democratic than the modem approach
because it ensures that the people's representatives are doing what
they were elected to do, that is, legislate. 3
It should be added that this approach by the Florida court is not
completely altruistic. Ostensibly, it would appear that the Florida
court is concerned with whether the delegation of excessive legisla-
tive authority to the executive branch of government violates the
separation of powers doctrine. By conceiving the issue as whether
the legislature has delegated too much authority to the executive
branch, the judiciary avoids the appearance of acting to protect its
own interests. Close scrutiny of the more recent delegation cases,
however, additionally reveals the Florida court's concern as to
whether the legislature has intruded upon the judiciary." The court
person belonging to or constituting one branch from exercising any of the powers
properly belonging to either of the other branches. Plaintiffs say that our Constitu-
tion is therefore more restrictive and sufficiently so to prevent the delegation here
involved even though a like delegation by the Congress may not offend federal
organic law.
There is no indication that our State Constitution was intended, with respect to
the delegation of legislative power, to depart from the basic concept of distribution
of the powers of government embodied in the Federal Constitution. It seems evident
that in this regard the design spelled out in our State Constitution would be implied
in constitutions which are not explicit in this regard. . . .We have heretofore said
our State Constitution is "no more restrictive" in this respect than the Federal
Constitution. . . .Indeed in our State the judiciary has accepted delegations of
legislative power which probably exceed federal experience.
Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572, 576-77 (N.J. 1972) (citations omitted).
42. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904); see State v. Griffin, 239 So. 2d 577
(Fla. 1970) (wherein the court noted that legislative delegations of power cannot be made in
general terms which leave no standards for the agency to use when performing its official
acts).
43. Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, The Laws and
Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 443, 445 (1977).
44. The Florida court has frequently expressed its concern that broad delegations will
interfere with its judicial review function. For example, the Cross Key court noted:
A corollary of the doctrine of unlawful delegation is the availability of judicial
review. In the final analysis it is the courts, upon a challenge to the exercise or
nonexercise of administrative action, which must determine whether the adminis-
trative agency has performed consistently with the mandate of the legislature.
When legislation is so lacking in guidelines that neither the agency nor the courts
can determine whether the agency is carrying out the intent of the legislature in
its conduct, then, in fact, the agency becomes the lawgiver rather than the adminis-
trator of the law.
372 So. 2d at 918-19.
See also Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626
(1963), concerning a delegation to the Secretary of the Interior: "[W]hatever the Secretary
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recognizes that if a statute allows a broad delegation to an adminis-
trative agency, a court will encounter great difficulty if it attempts
to review the agency's actions. 5 Therefore, in order to eliminate this
difficulty and to protect the court's review function, meaningful
legislative standards must exist. The Florida court's approach pro-
hibits wholesale delegation of legislative power and thereby protects
both legislative and judicial authority. The judicial branch, how-
ever, finds itself wielding tremendous veto power in precisely those
areas of welfare, planning, and general economic concern where the
lessons of the New Deal are assumed to have taught the judiciary
to intrude with extreme caution. 6 By mandating that the legislature
"legislate as far as practicable," the court is likely to become en-
gaged in a subjective analysis."7 Given the choice between locating
decides to do, this Court will surely be unable effectively to review his actions, since it will
not know what guides were intended by Congress to govern those actions."
45. Straughn v. O'Riordan, 338 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1976) is consistent with this concept.
There the statute provided that the Department of Revenue could require a bond from sales
tax registrants in "all cases where it is necessary to insure compliance with the provisions of
this chapter. ... Id. at 833. Although the court found this standard to be constitutionally
proper, it was able to take an easier way out. The court focused its attention on the Depart-
ment's failure to create strict standards which could "be applied to each sales tax applicant."
Id. at 834. Without the procedural deficiency, the court would not have been able to overturn
the action of the Department under the "necessary" standard.
46. The Cross Key court noted that: "Professor Davis maintains that . the doctrine,
in fact, has been used as a label to invalidate legislation of which courts disapprove without
any rational distinction between standards approved and those disapproved . 372 So.
2d at 922-23.
Professor 0. Douglas Weeks, however, has argued that judicial acceptance of broad stan-
dards may amount to judicial usurpation of legislative authority:
The question still remains, however, "what is a standard?".. How much of a
standard has been set up . . .that its rates be "just and reasonable" ... and...
its rules be "consistent with the public interest." If these vague terms are to be
given meaning in the last analysis by the courts, then it is obvious that the judicial
branch throws itself open to the charge of usurping legislative authority.
Weeks, Legislative Power Versus Delegated Legislative Power, 25 GEO. L.J. 314, 335 (1937)
(footnotes omitted).
47. This analysis is similar to the substantive due process activism found in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), where the Court determined that a law restricting the right of
employers and employees to contract to work was in violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
A more modern example of a subjective analysis is Sheeran v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
404 A.2d 625 (N.J. 1979). The New Jersey Supreme Court found an adequate standard in the
delegation of power to the Commissioner of Insurance to promulgate "reasonable rules and
regulations" in order to implement that state's No-Fault Act. The court proceeded further,
however, by supplying the "meaningful standards" that the legislature had neglected to add
to the delegation. Id. at 630.
By the boldness of this decision, the Sheeran court has perhaps illustrated that impotence
does not have to befall the judicial branch in those jurisdictions which have adopted the Davis
approach. Sheeran also nicely illustrates a situation where the legislature did not "legislate
as far as practicable." If the court can sua sponte list some meaningful standards to guide
the agency, why not the legislature? The separation of powers principle should be preserved
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broad unchecked power in low-visibility administrative agencies, as
opposed to the more visible judiciary, the politically desirable pref-
erence seems obvious.
Although Florida's approach to determining the validity of legis-
latively delegated power is expressed in separation of powers rheto-
ric, due process considerations also play a very large role.'8 In order
to ensure due process, and thereby protect private interests against
arbitrary action by an administrative agency, the court recognizes
that it must look beyond mere procedural safeguards.49 Accordingly,
the Florida Supreme Court has deemed meaningful legislative stan-
dards to be inexorably connected with due process protections. 0
so as to ensure against arbitrariness. Consequently, the judicial branch must be provided with
some meaningful legislative standards to allow for effective review. This review is impossible
if standards are nonexistent or if they are provided by either the court or the agency.
48. See, e.g., Lewis v. Bank of Pasco County, 346 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1976). The Lewis court
stated:
The legal principal [sic] guiding the Circuit Judge in this case and which is
dispositive of the issue under consideration is so well known as to be deemed
"hornbook" law. This Court had held in a long and unvaried line of cases that
statutes granting power to administrative agencies must clearly announce adequate
standards to guide the agencies in the execution of the powers delegated. The
statute must so clearly define the power delegated that the administrative agency
is precluded from acting through whim, showing favoritism, or exercising unbridled
discretion.
Id. at 55-56. See also Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36, 37 (Fla. 1969).
49. Cross Key, 372 So. 2d at 918. Although a Florida appellate court in Albrecht v.
Department of Envt'l Reg., 353 So. 2d 883, 887 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), has stated that
the 1974 Florida Administrative Procedure Act provides an "array of procedural safeguards
[and] has lessened the need for strict statutory standards in the delegation of power to
administrative agencies," that position has not been followed by the Florida Supreme Court.
At one time, it seemed that then Justice (now Chief Justice) England of the Florida Supreme
Court was about to adopt the modern position:
In summary, I conceive that the Legislature has lawfully delegated to the execu-
tive branch the enforcement of its announced policy in this area. There is no abuse
of that delegation so long as the class of prohibited acts are more specifically
defined by prospective administrative action to which the Administrative Proce-
dure Act applies.
Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 269 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., concur-
ring). However, Chief Justice England's concurring opinion in Cross Key is diametrically
opposed -to the Davis view:
Justice Sundberg [the author of the Askew v. Cross Key Waterways opinion] has
revitalized a vastly more important doctrine-one that guarantees that Florida's
government will continue to operate only by consent of the governed. He is saying,
quite simply, that whatever may be the governmental predilections elsewhere, in
Florida no person in one branch of our government may by accident or by assign-
ment act in a role assigned by the Constitution to persons in another branch.
372 So. 2d at 925. Then, however, in Department of Business Regulation v. National Manu-
factured Hous. Fed'n, Inc., 370 So. 2d 1132, 1137 (Fla. 1979), the Chief Justice concurred in
the result only. Although all this may lead one to speculate about the Chief Justice's position,
the recent cases indicate that the position of the Florida Supreme Court cannot be ques-
tioned. See, e.g., Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Division of Labor, 367 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1979).
50. For example, that court said in Drexel v. City of Miami Beach:
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Therefore, the key to predicting the position of the Florida Supreme
Court in borderline cases is to understand that the meaningful legis-
lative standards requirement has its roots in both separation of
powers and due process principles. Meaningful legislative standards
ensure that the judiciary will be able to exercise its review function
after agency action, thereby preserving a classic vision of the separa-
tion of powers. Prospectively speaking, the doctrine also ensures
that a court will be able to prevent favoritism by the agency., More
importantly, the doctrine promotes legitimate lawmaking by polic-
ing the legislative tendency to avoid painful policy decisions
through the delegation of power.
CONCLUSION
Anything short of "meaningful legislative standards," including
procedural protections, will not suffice.52 In point of fact, no proce-
We think a [governmental body] may not deprive a person of his property by
declining a permit . . . where the only restriction on the use of the police power is
that it shall not be exercised before "due consideration" is given ... to the effect
of the building upon traffic. Both the quoted words, as well as their synonyms, could
be construed to allow all manner of latitude in the grant of a permit in one case
and the denial of a permit in a similar one, and would give every opportunity for
the exercise of the power with partiality. Such laxness and inexactness in a delega-
tion of the power is not sanctioned by the courts.
64 So. 2d 317, 319 (Fla. 1953). Similarly, in Conner v. Joe Hatton, Inc., the court stated:
When the statute is couched in vague and uncertain terms or is so broad in scope
that no one can say with certainty, from the terms of the law itself, what would be
deemed an infringement of the law, it must be held unconstitutional as attempting
to grant to the administrative body the power to say what the law shall be.
216 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 240 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1970) (emphasis
in original). See also D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1977). For a general
review of other delegation cases in Florida see Comment, Delegation of Power: Judicial
Fetters Loosened?, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 1043 (1976); see also Note, Florida's Adherence to the
Doctrine of Nondelegation of Legislative Power, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 541 (1979).
51. Professor Sotirios Barber has noted:
It has been argued that, instead of always helping Congress achieve regulatory aims
it may not otherwise achieve, broad delegations can defeat such purposes. The
absence of reasonably clear statements of congressional policy has been seen as one
of the conditions under which the independence of administrative agencies is
threatened through the pressure of groups they are supposed to regulate and the
friends of those groups in Congress and the executive branch.
S. BARBER, TttE CONSTITUTION ON THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL PowER 3 (1975).
52. Professor Tribe, in referring to the federal system of checks and balances, sets forth
the necessity of legislative standards:
This requirement that delegated power include at least roughly intelligible
"standards" to guide the delegated party preserves, at least theoretically, both sets
of constitutional checks-judicial and political-on the exercise of coercive author-
ity in a "government of laws." So far as judicial checks are concerned, the theory
has been that, if the recipient of delegated power may exercise that power only
within judicially cognizable boundaries, then courts can determine (1) whether any
given action falls within the scope of delegated power and is thus defensible against
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dural protections can prevent arbitrary action by an administrative
agency (or any other organ of government). Procedurally proper
interference with someone's personal or property interests does not
lessen the arbitrariness of that interference. Formal constraints are
tautological when substantive concerns are at stake. Without the
existence of meaningful legislative standards a court has nothing to
review except compliance with internal, generalized procedural re-
quirements.
This is the primary point of distinction between the approach
taken by courts following the modern view, and those following the
more activist "meaningful legislative standards" approach. In the
former, the court resorts to procedural due process to protect inter-
ests it deems worthy of protection despite a lack of legislative stan-
dards. This highly discretionary and unpredictable approach results
in wholesale delegation of power to administrative agencies. Legisla-
tors will attempt to avoid hard policy decisions in order to evade the
rancor of special interest groups. In our present era of one issue
politics the fewer decisions that legislators have to make the better
they like it.
In Florida, a strict reading of the separation of powers principle
results in broad power being placed in the hands of the judiciary and
consequently requires the legislature to "legislate as far as practica-
ble." Florida's populist position ensures a more democratic form of
government, and in an era when governmental regulation has run
rampant, it at least ensures that the people's representatives and
not the bureaucrats are at the helm.
Delegation of lawmaking power is, of course, a categorical impera-
tive in modern government. But it is essential that the people's
representatives retain the primary legislative function, even while
delegating secondary power to legislate to agencies. In a represent-
ative system, it is the job of the people's representatives to make
a charge of complete lawlessness; (2) whether the power thus delegated is one
constitutionally possessed by Congress in the first place; and (3) whether the power
in question is one which is delegable or rests only in Congress. If the legislative
policies and standards guiding the agency are at least roughly understandable,
judicial review of the means chosen by the agency in exercising its delegated power
provides a safeguard of sorts against statutory or constitutional excesses.
Often, to be sure, the primary mode of governmental accountability is political
rather than legal. To the degree that this is so, limits on delegation of power serve
less to facilitate judicial review than to foster the political processes ordinarily
checking congressional action. From the political perspective, broad delegations of
power are objectionable because they permit responsibility for government action
to pass out of the hands of Congress. To a certain degree, therefore, broad delega-
tions undermine the electoral check on congressional power.
L. TamE, supra note 1. § 5-17 at 287-88 (footnote omitted).
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the hard choices that are necessary to set meaningful policies.
When Congress delegates wholesale powers, confined only by a
vague "public interest" standard, it abdicates its job of making the
difficult policy decisions. If the policy choices are thereby removed
from the political process, they are also removed from popular
control. To let the people's representatives pass the buck on policy
choices to the administrative experts is to let them cast their vote
for paternalism and against democracy.
53
Although procedural protections are important, a meaningful leg-
islative standards requirement is absolutely essential to preserve
effective judicial review of administrative agency actions and pow-
ers. By ensuring effective judicial review, constitutional priciples of
separation of powers and due process are preserved. But as Mr.
Justice Jackson aptly stated concerning such issues:
Just what our forefathers did envision or would have envisioned
had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined from mate-
rials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to
interpret for Pharoah. A century and a half of partisan debate and
scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more
53. Schwartz, supra note 40, at 460. In addition to Florida, two of the other jurisdictions
that have resisted the modem approach are Illinois and Arizona. In Stofer v. Motor Vehicle
Cas. Co., 369 N.E.2d 875 (Il. 1977), the Illinois Supreme Court discussed the need for
intelligible legislative standards:
Without sufficient statutory directions against which to compare administrative
regulations, the mere existence of judicial review is not a meaningful safeguard
against administrative abuses. . . . Thus, unless found in the statute, the re-
straints which the judiciary is to apply to safeguard against the abuse of discretion
in administrative rule making simply do no exist.
Id. at 879 (citations omitted). Of great importance to the hypothesis of this article is the
statement of the court that "The legislature must do all that is practical to define the scope
of the legislation, i.e., the persons and activities which may be subject to the administrator's
authority. This effort is necessary to put interested persons on notice of the possibility of
administrative actions affecting them." Id.
While also rejecting the modem approach, an Arizona appellate court seemed less con-
cemed about broad delegations interfering with judicial power than either the Florida or
Illinois courts:
The Court recognizes that some writers have advocated the discontinuance of the
"adequate standards" rule for testing claimed unconstitutional delegations of legis-
lative power in favor of a test involving an examination of the challenged legislation
to determine whether there are sufficient procedural safeguards to protect those
affected by the law. . . . We find no Arizona decisions adopting this view, and we
are not persuaded. . ..
"'One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon
the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other
body or authority."'
State Compensation Fund v. De La Fuente, 501 P.2d 422, 426-27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
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or less apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any
question.54
Therefore, even if courts like the New Jersey Supreme Court are
not persuaded to reverse their noninterventionist position on this
matter, perhaps they will avoid future confusion by abandoning the
pretense that they observe a legislative standards requirement. A
court which finds language such as "in the public interest ' 15 to be
a sufficient legislative standard, is not in truth requiring any such
standard at all and should therefore adjust its opinions to reflect the
realities of its conduct.
54. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
55. See, e.g., Ward v. Scott, 93 A.2d 385, 388 (N.J. 1952), where the court stated: "[Tlhe
exigencies of modern government have increasingly dictated the use of general rather than
minutely detailed standards in regulatory enactments under the police power. Thus, the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners has been guided by simple standards of 'public con-
venience and necessity' . . . and 'just and reasonable."'
See also F. Coopmx, AD.snTRAThrE AGzNcms Arm THE CoumRS 47 (1951):
A standard which attempts to anticipate every possible situation is likely to defeat
the whole purpose of delegation. On the other hand, one which reflects the empty
generalities of "reasonableness" or "public interest"-criteria which would be sup-
plied by implication in any event-tends to substitute a government by men for
one of laws.
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